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PREFACE 
 The origin of this project is personal in nature.  I was raised on a farm in rural 
Oregon.  Cooperatives were always part of my life because our farm belongs to a 
hazelnut marketing cooperative and my father also works as an agronomist at a local 
supply cooperative.  Cooperatives were interesting to me because they have the 
potential to slow or reverse the trend of corporatization of agriculture as well as protect 
smaller family-owned farms.   
Agricultural cooperatives are an ideal topic for Planning, Public Policy and 
Management because they combine both issues of agriculture policy and nonprofit 
management.  They also operate as civil society institutions and political pressure 
groups, which are commonly studied in the field of Political Science.  Given the nature 
of agricultural cooperatives and my double major in Political Science and Planning, 
Public Policy and Management, an interdisciplinary approach was a natural fit.  I drew 
mostly on economics and political science to reach analytical conclusions.  My use of 
collective action theory is emblematic of this approach.  However, since cooperatives 
are nonprofits and businesses, some business and legal theory were also included.  
Since this is a thesis through the Robert D. Clark Honors College, I also felt 
comfortable including some humanities, such as philosophy and history, in my 
background and literature review. 
 The selection of Turkey as subject of my research might seem somewhat odd to 
a casual observer.  Why exactly is Turkey worth studying in this way?  Turkey has a 
high number of cooperatives and their mixed success is a frustrating puzzle to those 
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involved.  However, what first drew me to Turkey was not the precarious state of its 
cooperatives.  The draw had more to do with Turkey’s history, which is appropriate 
given that the Clark Honors College is a liberal arts school. Since the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire, and some would argue before, Turkey has found itself struggling with 
its national identity.  It lies on the crossroads between Asia, the Middle East and 
Europe.  It could be understood through any one of those lenses and this causes conflict.  
Since the abolition of the caliphate, there has also been an intense debate as to whether 
Turkey should be secular and “western” or an Islamic state.  These questions of national 
identity have always been fascinating to me.  While they don’t arise explicitly in my 
thesis or research, any discussion of Turkey will find them just below the surface. 
 I would also like to take this opportunity acknowledge the people who helped 
make this thesis project possible.  First, I would like to thank my parents, Kevin and 
Amy Aman for their love and support.  My father was also immensely helpful 
throughout the research process by providing an insider’s perspective to agricultural 
cooperatives. I would also like to thank my girlfriend, Nicole Kramer, who I love dearly 
and encouraged and inspired me at the darkest moments of this process.  I want to give 
my thanks to those that helped me with my research by pointing me to people and 
places I never would have otherwise found.  Thanks to everyone who allowed me to 
interview them, especially those in Turkey. Finally, I want to express my deepest 
appreciation and gratitude to my thesis adviser, Michael Hibbard.  His guidance and 
editing have proved invaluable in the past year.
 
 
Chapter I: Problem Statement 
Introduction 
 According to The Secret History of the Mongols, an ancestor of Genghis Khan, 
Alan Ho’a, had five sons who were constantly quarreling amongst themselves.  One 
day, Ho’a gathered them together and presented each with an arrow.  She instructed her 
sons to break their arrows, and they did so easily.  Then she took five arrows and bound 
them together with rope.  She asked her sons to break the bundle of arrows, but they 
could not.  Upon their failure, she said to them, “Brothers who work separately, like a 
single arrow shaft, can be easily broken, but brothers who stand together against the 
world, like a bundle of arrows, cannot be broken.”1  The point of this parable is to teach 
the importance of cooperation for mutual benefit.  Like the sons in the story, farmers are 
in competition to produce the highest yield of crops and attain the highest price for their 
goods.  But also like the sons, they face great adversity from outside forces.  Such 
forces include bad weather conditions, a global marketplace, and price instability, to 
name a few.  The purpose of my thesis is to examine a possible solution to these woes: 
agricultural cooperatives. 
 This study specifically focuses on agricultural cooperatives in the nation of 
Turkey.  Turkey is an ideal subject for several reasons. It has a long history of 
agricultural cooperatives that stretches back before the Ottoman Empire to the late 
thirteenth century.2  Furthermore, despite recent developments, it remains the most 
                                                          
1 Paula Sabloff, Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan, (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2001) 
2 Okan, Nedret. Food and Agriculture Organization, "An Overview of Turkish Cooperatives." Last 
modified 2013.  
2 
 
developed liberal democracy in the Middle East.  It is currently a candidate country for 
membership in the European Union.  Between 2002 and 2012, Turkey’s GDP per capita 
increased 20% relative to the Euro Area.3 These facts are relevant because they 
characterize Turkey as a nation that is amiable toward democratic principles and is 
more industrialized than many comparable Middle Eastern and Eastern European 
nations.  Theoretically, this would allow Turkey to develop stronger cooperatives than a 
nation without these attributes. 
However, even given these strengths, the results of Turkey’s cooperatives have 
been mixed. On one hand, agricultural credit cooperatives are generally considered 
financial successes. These institutions receive heavy support from the state and, in turn, 
are subject to heavy regulation.  On the other hand, agricultural sales cooperatives find 
themselves in a much worse position.  Because they are controlled by different 
government ministries, they receive far less state support.  As a result, every agricultural 
sales cooperative in Turkey is in bankruptcy.    
 Turkey’s lack of success in cooperative agriculture raises many interesting 
questions about how Turkish agricultural cooperatives are organized and managed.  I 
considered three variables that are crucial in the management of cooperatives in any 
setting: interactions between the state and the cooperative, decisions made by the 
cooperative’s executive team, and the degree of control cooperative members have over 
their cooperative.  My thesis seeks to explore and evaluate why Turkey’s cooperatives 
remain stagnant.  How does member control and involvement affect their efficacy and 
whether increased state intervention have an effect on collective action.  According to 
                                                          
3 Eurostat, "GDP per capita in PPS." Last modified 06 1, 2013. Accessed November 24, 2013. 
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Gulen Ozdemir, cooperatives are regulated differently by what type of cooperative it 
is.4  Credit and sales cooperatives run as “top down organizations,” hence they are 
generally stable institutions; but they are not democratic and do not provide useful 
services to their members.  Meanwhile, development cooperatives are “bottom up” in 
that they are democratic in nature and have services that are useful to their members; 
but they are less financially stable.  By comparing these two types of cooperatives, I am 
able to ask the research question: How does the democratic control of Turkish 
agricultural cooperatives by members influence them as institutions and how does 
it affect their efficacy?  In order to answer these questions, I have analyzed Turkish 
agricultural co-operatives and conducted open-ended interviews with scholars and 
practitioners. 
 In the next paragraph, I establish the importance of this study and its 
contribution to the academic literature.  Then, I use the remainder of the chapter to 
provide background information on my topic.  I will cover the basic fundamentals of 
cooperative regulation and law in the United States as a foundational example for how a 
government handles cooperatives.  After that, I will briefly describe the methodology I 
have utilized in my thesis.  Finally, I will give an overview of the structure of my thesis 
on a chapter-by-chapter basis. 
Importance of the Study 
Cooperatives are often discussed as a possible means of economic development, 
especially in rural regions that rely on agriculture for their economy.  The United 
                                                          
4 Ozdemir, Gulen. Journal of Asian Economics, "Cooperative Shareholder Relations in agricultural 
cooperatives in Turkey." Last modified 1 25, 2005.  
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Nations emphasized this in their literature on the 2012 Year of Cooperatives initiative. 
Despite its strong economic growth in recent years, the majority of Turkey’s landmass 
is unindustrialized and rural.  Of Turkey’s rural population, 35% is living below the 
poverty line.5 Rural poverty hits women harder than men, and in these regions only 
25% of the labor force is made up of women.  As these dire statistics show, the country 
is still in need of rural and agricultural development.  Cooperatives could be a possible 
avenue for this development.  Since Turkey has a fairly stable, modern, and democratic 
government, development through cooperatives is more feasible than in other 
developing countries.  Yet, agricultural cooperatives in Turkey remain stagnant.  There 
is a significant amount of literature on agricultural cooperatives in the field of 
agricultural economics.  This literature analyzes cooperatives using paradigms such as 
game theory and econometrics.  There is also literature that evaluates and explains 
cooperatives through the lens of business and nonprofit theory.  The literature is both 
theoretical and specific case studies and analysis.  However, there is very little that 
focuses on Turkey or similar developing nations with high economic growth and large 
agriculture sectors.   
Background 
What is a Cooperative? 
A cooperative is an alternative business model to the standard corporation.  A 
corporation is owned its shareholders; however, there is no limit to the number of 
shareholders that could be invested in it.  The day-to-day operations of the cooperative 
                                                          
5 International Fund for Agricultural Development1, "Rural Poverty in Turkey." Last modified 2010. 
Accessed November 21, 2013. 
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are handled by a team of management executives and staff.  The purpose of a standard 
corporation is to maximize profits in order to raise the share price and provide a 
dividend to shareholders.  A cooperative has a very similar management structure; but 
its ownership and mission are entirely different.  Its purpose is to provide services to 
members rather than maximize profits.  These members replace the role of stockholders 
in the organization.  Each member has equity in the organization and has an equal share 
in the organization.  Depending on the cooperative, these services might take a variety 
of forms. With credit unions, which are a form of cooperative, members gain access to 
savings accounts, checking accounts, and insurance.6 An agricultural cooperative might 
sell equipment or fertilizers to member farmers, process and distribute goods, and make 
loans. 
Types of Agricultural Cooperatives 
There are several different types of agricultural cooperatives that serve different 
needs and functions.7  First, there is the marketing cooperative, which processes, 
packages, and distributes agricultural products.  Many popular brands of agricultural 
products in the United States are owned by cooperatives, including: Ocean Spray 
(fruit/juices), Sun-Maid (raisins), and Land O’Lakes (dairy products).  A supply 
cooperative gives farmers inputs like seed, fertilizer, fuel and services like planting or 
harvesting.  Credit cooperatives operate like a credit union and provide farmers with 
low interest loans and banking services. Finally, bargaining cooperatives negotiate on 
                                                          
6 Oregon Community Credit Union, "Member Services." Accessed November 14, 2013. 
7 Broadmoore, Amy. "What are Agricultural Cooperatives." Agricultural Law (blog), 10 31, 2006.  
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behalf of their members with the processors in order to get a price that is more favorable 
to farmers.   
In Turkey, these types of cooperatives still exist, but under different names.8  
Marketing cooperatives are referred to as agricultural sales cooperatives.  Agricultural 
credit cooperatives in Turkey provide much more than simply access to credit.  They 
are basically equivalent to supply cooperatives in the United States and also offer 
financial services.  Agricultural Development Cooperatives are not found in the United 
States at all like they are in Turkey.  They provide a range of services to their members 
such as machinery pools, technical expertise, and irrigation.  In the United States, these 
services would likely be provided by a supply cooperative or an individual cooperative 
that specialized in that service.9   
How Do Cooperatives Work? 
In United States, cooperatives are classified as 501(c)(12) nonprofits.  
Cooperatives themselves are exempt from corporate income taxes although members 
must still pay taxes on the income that comes from the cooperative in the form of a 
dividend.10  In the United States, cooperatives also benefit from special exemptions to 
antitrust law thanks to the Capper-Volstead Act.11  This law, passed by congress in 
1922, legally recognizes cooperatives by granting them special exemptions and 
restrictions.  A cooperative must be operated democratically and each member may vote 
                                                          
8 Ozdemir, Gulen. Journal of Asian Economics, "Cooperative Shareholder Relations in agricultural 
cooperatives in Turkey." Last modified 1 25, 2005. 
9 Okan, Nedret. Food and Agriculture Organization, "An Overview of Turkish Cooperatives." Last 
modified 2013. 
10 Cornell Law School, "26 USC Part I - TAX TREATMENT OF COOPERATIVES." Last modified 08 
13, 2013. Accessed November 14, 2013. 
11 "Representing the Business Interests of Agriculture." National Council of Farmer Cooperatives. 
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, n.d. Web. 3 June 2012.   
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in elections to select the board of directors.  The board of directors sets the general 
direction and chooses the executive staff (CEO, CFO, etc.) to run the day-to-day 
operations. There can also be votes for decisions that would have a major impact on the 
members of a cooperative.  Unlike a corporation, a more powerful shareholder does not 
have more influence in the operation.  For example, if a particular farmer belongs to a 
wheat marketing cooperative, and he accounts for 10% of the volume of wheat that the 
cooperative takes in, he is entitled to 10% of the profits. However, this only entitles him 
to one vote; the same as all larger and smaller shareholders in the cooperative.  In a 
standard corporation model, a person with a 10% stake is entitled to 10% of the profit 
and 10% of the votes to make management decisions. Cooperatives toare allowed to 
violate antitrust laws in order to act collectively. In exchange, cooperatives are required 
to comply with several conditions.  Cooperatives must either give each member a single 
vote in board elections regardless of stock held or pay a dividend no more than 8% of 
capital investment per year and from doing a majority of its business with nonmembers.  
The purpose of these restrictions is to make sure that cooperatives are providing 
services to their members and not pursuing profit maximization. 
Theory of Agricultural Cooperatives 
Since the development of the modern cooperative movement in the 19th century, 
a number of competing schools of thought have arisen surrounding them.12  The schools 
can be divided into two camps: American and European.  The major European school 
was the commonwealth school; it, like most of its European counterparts was idealistic 
                                                          
12Togerson, Randall. University of Wisconsin, "EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THOUGHT, 
THEORY AND PURPOSE." Last modified 1 16, 1997. Accessed November 21, 2013.   
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in nature.  It grew out of the anarchist and socialist movements that were popular among 
the European Intelligentsia at the time. It postulated that cooperatives would eventually 
become the prevailing business model in agribusiness.  It would make coalitions with 
similar likeminded leftist organizations such as labor unions.   
The two American schools are more known for their practicality (and admittedly 
less left-wing).  The California School is defined by aggressive cooperative advocacy in 
order to benefit farmers.13  Aaron Shapiro, the founder of the California School and a 
lawyer by trade, believed farmers were being taken advantage of by large agribusiness 
and financial firms.  His goal was to use cooperatives to increase productivity through 
competition and shift the balance of power back to farmers. 
The Nourse School rose in opposition to the California School by arguing it 
went too far by advocating cooperative monopolies in markets.14  Instead, cooperatives 
should be smaller, more local, and have more membership control.  Their primary 
purpose should be to offer farmers a “competitive yardstick.”  By this Nourse meant 
that cooperatives would allow farmers to see if they were getting a bad deal from for-
profit firms.   
The two schools had a distinct effect on how cooperatives organized themselves 
in 20th century America.15 Adherents of the California School set up large cooperatives 
that tried to control a large market share in agricultural commodities.  The Nourse 
                                                          
13 Larsen, Grace. The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, "Asron Scapiro: Genius of Farm (o-operative 
Promotion." Last modified 09 1962. Accessed November 28, 2013. 
14 Nourse, E.G. Journal of Cooperatives, "The Place for Cooperatives in Our Economy." Last modified 
1942. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/46287/2/Volume 7 Article 
8.pdf. 
15 Togerson, Randall. University of Wisconsin, "EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THOUGHT, 
THEORY AND PURPOSE." Last modified 1 16, 1997. Accessed November 21, 2013.   
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School influenced smaller cooperatives that were more “bottom up” organizations.
  
Economics of Cooperatives  
When thinking about possible benefits of cooperatives to famers, consider the 
economics of small independent farmers.  Their production exceeds the demand at the 
extremely local level (enough to feed their families and sell at the local farmers market). 
What should they do with the surplus? Of course they should sell it; but to whom?  
None of them individually produces a large enough crop to justify building a processor, 
or packaging and distributing their commodities themselves.  Therefore, they must sell 
their products to a company that processes and distributes that commodity to 
consumers.  In a perfectly competitive market, there would be many producers and 
processors competing amongst themselves for market share.  This would lead to a 
commodity of uniform quality being traded solely on price. This would lead the market 
price to converge at an optimal equilibrium for both the buyer and seller.  Such a market 
would look like this: 
10 
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           Fig. 1: Supply and Demand Curve in Perfect Equilibrium 
However, that does not reflect the reality.  Often, there are only one or two 
processors in a given market.  In most cases, the burden is on farmers to transport the 
crop to the processor; therefore it is unfeasible to bring their crops to a competitor that 
is farther away for a higher price.  That means that there will always be lower demand 
than supply, hence lower prices for farmers.  Thus, the demand curve is shifted and 
actually looks like this:                   
Fig. 2: Supply and Demand Curve Adjusted Equilibrium 
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In light of this, the goals of cooperatives are to lower the cost of production for 
farmers and to act collectively when negotiating a price with processors or retailers.  
The California School of Cooperative Theory, pioneered by Aaron Sapiro, “sought to 
correct imbalances in grower treatment and improve marketing coordination by using 
cooperatives organized along commodity lines to achieve more orderly marketing.”16  
Sapiro believed that cooperatives existing in the marketplace will make the market more 
efficient and productive.  This has the effect of shifting the supply curve back toward 
the middle to equitability for both sides. 
Cooperatives in the Developing World 
 Cooperatives have perhaps the greatest possibility in the developing world.  The 
equity divide between processors and producers is even more pronounced in this 
context.  Through pooling resources, farmers could invest in modern farming 
techniques that would increase yield and reduce hunger in developing countries.  
However, there are inherent challenges to a “bottom-up” enterprise that can be even 
harder to weather in the developing world.  It can be difficult to get a group of people to 
cooperate under any circumstances; this can be exacerbated by insecure property rights, 
and extreme poverty.  Furthermore, in this sort of environment, there is a lack of quality 
management and business professionals to operate the organization. Unlike in the 
United States or Europe, the regulatory apparatus simply is not there; and governments 
can be neglectful or even adverse to cooperative efforts.17 
                                                          
16 Togerson, Randall. University of Wisconsin, "EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THOUGHT, 
THEORY AND PURPOSE." Last modified 1 16, 1997. Accessed November 21, 2013.  
17 Hahn, Robert. World Bank, "The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing 
Countries." Last modified 1997. Accessed November 24, 2013. 
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Cooperatives in Turkey 
Turkey has a long and illustrious history with cooperative enterprise. Ahi Evren 
(1172-1261), a Turkish craftsman, economist, and religious figure formed the “Ahi 
Movement.”18 The goal of the movement was to conduct commerce in an ethical way 
without exploiting either producers or consumers. It cannot properly be categorized as a 
cooperative, but it shared many of the same values and goals.  This is significant 
because the cooperative movement only came to fruition in Europe in the 19th century.  
In the 19th century, Turkey under the Ottomans instituted “country chests,” which was a 
proto-credit cooperative.19  In 1912, the first real attempt was made at an agricultural 
marketing cooperative. The fig growers of the Aegean region formed the Taris Union of 
Fig Producers (which still exists today20) to break the monopoly in the fig market.21   
Turkish Politics 
 Broadly, Turkish history can be divided into three eras: Pre-Ottoman, The 
Ottoman Empire, and the Post-Ottoman Republic.  The Pre-Ottoman Turks were 
nomadic steppe people that descended from Central Asia.22  Eventually, they began to 
adopt agriculture and settle in the fertile Anatolia and Rumelia.   
From 1374 to 1918, the Ottoman Empire Turks ruled large portions of territory 
outside of Turkey from the Balkans to Arabia to North Africa.  Arnold Toynbee notes 
that the Ottoman Empire “inevitably broke down, though, being more scientifically 
                                                          
18Okan, Nedret. Food and Agriculture Organization, "An Overview of Turkish Cooperatives." Last 
modified 2013. Accessed November 21, 2013.  
19 Okan, Nedret. Food and Agriculture Organization, "An Overview of Turkish Cooperatives." Last 
modified 2013. Accessed November 21, 2013 
20 Taris Figs Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union, "About Us." Accessed November 24, 2013.  
21 Okan, Nedret. Food and Agriculture Organization, "An Overview of Turkish Cooperatives." Last 
modified 2013. Accessed November 21, 2013. 
22 Aksin, Sina. Turkey: from Empire to Revolutionary Republic. (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 3. 
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constructed than most of its kind, it defied destiny for a longer period and struggled 
more obstinately against dissolution than the empires of the Huns, the Avars, the 
Mongols.”23 The key to its longevity was its ability to import its administration into its 
newly acquired provinces and delegate power to regional governors.  Yet at same time, 
throughout the height of its power, it remained a vertically integrated and hierarchical 
organization.  Toynbee notes that the Turks, because they descended from steppe 
herdsmen, tended to see the citizens of the empire as “human cattle.”24  The members of 
the bottom parts of Ottoman society such as merchants and peasants were collectively 
referred to as the Reaya or “The Flock.”25  The sultan took upon himself the position of 
shepherd to the flock, while the military (especially the Janissaries) and administration 
of the empire assumed the role of watchdog over the flock.26 
  Beginning in 1918, after the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, the 
Ottoman Empire was dissolved.27  Out of the ensuing political vacuum, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk led a revolution against the Allies and established the Republic of Turkey and 
established the capital at Ankara.  As the founder of the republic and the first President 
of Turkey, he reengineered Turkish government, law and society.  His goal was to 
quickly modernize Turkey and create a secular westernized state.  The Constitution of 
1924, which were part of Atatürk’s Reforms, created legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches.  The Constitution of 1924 was replaced by newer constitutions in 1961 and 
                                                          
23 Arnold Toynbee, and Kenneth Kirkwood, Turkey, (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1927), 20. 
24 Arnold Toynbee, and Kenneth Kirkwood, Turkey, (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1927), 21. 
25 Aksin, Sina. Turkey: from Empire to Revolutionary Republic. (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 9. 
26 Arnold Toynbee, and Kenneth Kirkwood, Turkey, (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1927), 21. 
27 Arnold Toynbee, and Kenneth Kirkwood, Turkey, (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1927), 21. 
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1982 as the result of military coups.28  Subsequent constitutions led to a more 
conventional parliamentary democracy.29   
In recent decades, Turkey has seen a greater degree of political stability.  The 
ruling majority has consistently been dominated by center-right political parties.  The 
current ruling AK Party is committed to economic and social conservatism. (One might 
uncharitably call it Islamism.)  As a parliamentary democracy, it is governed by a prime 
minister from the ruling party.  Turkey also has a president that is elected 
democratically, but it is a largely ceremonial figurehead position. 
Geography of Turkey 
  Turkey is a fairly large country with an area of 302,535 square miles (roughly 
twice the size of California).30  As such, the climate and geography vary across its 
borders.  It shares elements of Mediterranean, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern 
climates.  Naturally, different climates are ideal for different crops, which incline 
Turkey toward a more diversified agricultural economy. According to the New 
Agriculturist, 57% of Turkey’s agricultural industry is made up of crop production, 34% 
is dedicated to livestock production, 6% to forestry, and 3% to fisheries.31  Of the crop 
producing land in Turkey, 75% raises cereal grains (wheat and barley in particular).  
Other major crops are fruits such as, grapes, dates, figs, olives, apricots, and citrus 
fruits. Turkey is also a major producer of hazelnuts and legumes.  It also produces large 
                                                          
28 Weiker, Walter. The Turkish Revolution: 1960-1961. Washington,  D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1963. 
29 Turkish Grand National Assembly, "Constitution of the Republic." Last modified 1982. Accessed April 
7, 2014.  
30 Infoplease, "Turkey." Last modified 2005. Accessed April 13, 2014. 
31 New Agriculturist, "Country profile - Turkey." Last modified 05 2000. Accessed April 13, 2014. 
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amounts of cash crops like cotton and tobacco.  Among livestock bred in Turkey, the 
most popular are sheep, goats, and poultry.  This map32 displays the dominant crop in 
the various regions of Turkey: 
 
Fig. 3: Dominant Crop in Turkey by Region 
Turkey has a population of 74 million with a growth rate of 1.3%.33 As a 
developing economy with a mostly agrarian economy, Turkey has a rather sparse 
population density.  The majority of population is focused into urban centers, but the 
majority of land is lightly populated agricultural land.  This map34 illustrates the 
                                                          
32 NationMasters, "Turkey - Dominant Crop Areas." Last modified 2014. Accessed April 13, 2014. 
33 Central Intelligence Agency. "World Factbook- Turkey." Central Intelligence Agency. (accessed April 
14, 2014). 
34 Encylopedia Britannica, "Turkey: Population Density." Last modified 2002. Accessed April 13, 2014. 
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population density in Turkey:
 
Fig. 4: Population Density in Turkey 
  Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has defined itself as a 
homeland for ethnic Turks.  This has proved problematic for the ethnic minority groups 
that live in live in Turkey.  According to the CIA World Factbook, 70-75% of the 
population is Turkish, 18% are Kurdish, and the remainder being an assortment of 
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minorities.  This map35 displays the dominant ethnic groups across Turkey: 
 
Fig. 5: Dominant Ethnic Group in Turkey by Region 
For years, the Kurds have been working to carve a state out of Southeastern 
Turkey, Northwestern Iran, and Northern Iraq and Syria.  The most significant territory 
in most proposed boundaries for a hypothetical Kurdistan comes from Turkey. Notice 
where Kurdish territory lies in relation to the agricultural geography of Turkey; western 
part of the country is well suited to crop production and the eastern portion is 
mountainous and only suitable for livestock herding. 
 The other ethnic concern facing Turkey is the Armenian Genocide.  The 
Armenian Genocide occurred under the rule of the Young Turks during World War I.36  
                                                          
35 Blogspot. "The Sixteen Petal Flower / Sixteen Spoke Wheel symbol of Israel." The Sixteen Petal 
Flower / Sixteen Spoke Wheel symbol of Israel. 
36 Adalian, Rouban. "Ottoman Empire and the Armenian Genocide." Ottoman Empire and the Armenian 
Genocide. 
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The Young Turks led a military coup against the Ottoman Empire and abolished the 
absolute rule of the sultanate and replaced it with a constitutional monarchy.37  The 
Young Turk movement was made up of westernized progressive university students and 
military officers.  The party that came forth from the movement had two factions: 
liberal reformers and Turkish nationalists.  The Young Turks blamed their military 
defeats against the Russians on the local Armenian population.  They accused the 
Armenian population of aiding the enemy and planning to secede and form an 
autonomous state.  What resulted was the first modern genocide.  It began by arresting 
and summarily executing Armenian leaders and intellectuals.  Then, the military killed 
Armenian men through forced labor and extermination.  Women and children were sent 
to concentration camps in the Syrian Desert.  It is estimated that the Ottoman Empire 
killed 1 to 1.5 million Armenians between 1914 and 1918.  Despite condemnations 
from the international community, the government of Turkey still refuses to 
acknowledge the events as genocide and even that they occurred at all.38  As a result, 
relations between Turkey and Armenia remain tense and the position of the Armenian 
community remains precarious. 
Culture of Turkey 
Turkey, since the dawn of the Ottoman Empire, has been a predominantly 
Islamic region.  According to the CIA World Factbook, 99.8% of the population is 
                                                          
37 Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. Preparation for a revolution: the Young Turks, 1902-1908. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
38 Hovannisian, Richard G.. Remembrance and denial: the case of the Armenian genocide. Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1998. 
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identifies as Muslim.39  Of that Muslim population, the majority is Sunni.  After 
Atatürk’s reforms, the country was greatly secularized and Islam was removed from the 
law and government.  For a period of time, religious education was forbidden.40  After 
the suppression of religion as part of the Atatürk reforms, religion in public life has 
reemerged; however it remains a constant struggle within Turkish society. 
According to a hadith (quotations from Muhammad or his followers that make 
up the Islamic theological tradition), Muslims are called to agriculture: “If the Day of 
Resurrection about to occur, while in the hands of one of you is a palm seed is planted 
when he was able to before the end of the world then he should plant it.”41  According 
to the interpretation, a good Muslim ought to engage in agriculture, even when there is 
no direct benefit to oneself, because it benefits others and fulfills their call to charity.  
This firmly establishes agriculture as necessary and productive in an Islamic society 
(such as Turkey).   
Furthermore, Islam encourages fair business practices and dealings.  Anas Ibn 
Malik relates the following hadith: “Allah’s Messenger forbade the sale of fruits till 
they are almost ripe. Anas was asked what is meant by ‘are almost ripe.’ He replied, 
‘Till they become red.’ Allah’s Messenger further said, ‘If Allah spoiled the fruits, what 
right would one have to take the money of one’s brother?’”42  This principle can be 
applied beyond agriculture, but it is perfectly applicable to agriculture.  A farmer ought 
                                                          
39 Central Intelligence Agency. "World Factbook- Turkey." Central Intelligence Agency. (accessed April 
14, 2014). 
40 Georgetown University. "Turkey: AtatÃ¼rk and the Secular State." Turkey: AtatÃ¼rk and the Secular 
State.  
41 Priyadi, Sugeng. "Islam invites Muslims to raise." AGRICULTURE IN ISLAM. (accessed April 20, 
2014). 
42 Beekun, Rafik. "Islamic Business Ethics." Institute for Islamic Thought. November 1, 1996. 
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not to sell a crop they know is defective or unsatisfactory and a supplier should not 
provide goods at reasonable prices.  Islamic law bans usury (charging interest on 
loans).43  In Turkey this is not legally forbidden because the state is secular.  However, 
it is considered sinful in the eyes of Islam. According to Businessculture.org, the culture 
of business in Turkey is relationship-based and very hierarchical.44   
Organization of Thesis 
 Directly following this introductory chapter, in the second chapter I review the 
academic literature and theory associated with my topic. In my third chapter, I state my 
research question and methodology.  The fourth chapter contains my research findings, 
which consists of an analysis of interviews and documents.  Finally, the fifth chapter 
contains policy recommendations based on my findings and a conclusion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Gambling, Trevor, and Rifaat Ahmed Karim. Business and accounting ethics in Islam. London: 
Mansell, 1991. 
44 European Commission. "Turkey." Business Culture, 2013. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
Introduction  
My literature review will cover the theories that undergird my thesis.  The 
theories I will cover are: cooperation, game theory, collective action, and member 
relations.  These all describe, in some respect, how cooperatives function and, at times, 
break down.  These theories, collective action and game theory especially, explain how 
people interact and work together.  At its most basic, a cooperative is a group of people 
collaborating to fulfill their common needs.  Through the course of this chapter I 
introduce each theory in general terms and apply it specifically to agricultural 
cooperatives.   
Theories 
Cooperation 
 Cooperation occurs when multiple organisms work together toward a common 
goal of mutual benefit.  Games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Darwin’s theory of 
evolutionary competition are pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation and favor 
individual self-interest.  Conversely, there were others who were more hopeful.  In 
Mutual Aid, Russian radical anarchist thinker Peter Kropotkin optimistically argued that 
previous interpretations of Darwin were fundamentally wrong.45  Darwin’s notions of 
species adapting to their environments were correct.  However, instead of being in 
competition for food and mates, individuals of the same species were meant to 
                                                          
45 Kropotkin, Petr Alekseevich, and Emile Capouya. The Essential Kropotkin. “Mutual Aid.” New York: 
Liveright, 1975. 
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cooperate and help each other survive for the betterment of the species.  One could 
argue that there is a parallel between the ideas of Kropotkin and the idealistic 
philosophy of the first European agricultural cooperatives. 
Ernst Fehr, an Austrian Economist, argues that cooperation can exist, but there 
must be a framework that punishes free riders and rewards cooperation.46  One can 
reasonably state that a group can accomplish more than an individual.  Given that 
premise, individuals are provided an incentive to cooperate.  However, for an 
individual, it is possible to reap the rewards of the group’s efforts without contributing, 
which is known as freeriding.  Despite the greater benefit for the group, the freerider 
takes advantage of their efforts for personal gain.  Since this is the case, Fehr argues that 
an individual who would otherwise be predisposed to cooperation would not contribute 
because they do not see the situation as “fair.”  According to Fehr, perceived fairness 
and individual incentives are the biggest In order to overcome this challenge and make 
cooperation possible, a framework must be instituted that rewards cooperation and 
disciplines freeriders.   
However, Robert Axelrod, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, 
theorized that cooperation is possible even in anarchy.47  In this situation, anarchy can 
mean one of two things.  It can mean a Hobbesian state of nature; a state of pure 
competition, where there is no state to enforce justice and the strong dominate the 
weak.48  The second interpretation is Kantian anarchy in which moral norms exist, but 
                                                          
46 Fehr, Ernst. Quarterly Journal of Economics, "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation." 
Last modified 1999. Accessed November 28, 2013. 
47Axelrod, Robert. Science, "Evolution of Cooperation." Last modified 03 27, 1981. Accessed November 
28, 2013.   
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with no enforcement mechanism.49  The first is always negative, but the second one is 
not necessarily bad.  Both interpretations can be cited in political and biological 
examples.  However, for this situation, Kant’s interpretation is more prescient.  
Darwin’s theory is counterfactual because there is evidence in nature that organisms 
cooperate.  Animals, for instance, live in anarchy and have no system of punishment or 
reward; yet they cooperate.  Axelrod cites the example of bees pollinating flowers.  
Both species benefit from the exchange and it becomes more widespread because of its 
success. Axelrod uses both biological and social science examples to develop a strategy 
for cooperation and quantify its success.  Through his reasoning, it should be possible 
for humans to cooperate even without a formal framework to hold them accountable. 
 According to psychological research, the instinct of whether or not to cooperate 
with others is based on trust. According to Gareth Jones and Jennifer George, trust is 
built and maintained through increased interaction and familiarity, as well as shared 
goals, attitudes and values.50  This is why we trust family members more than we trust 
strangers.  Recognizing this, some organizations have begun to encourage working in 
smaller tight-knit groups.  Certain organizations have also flattened their management 
structure to foster a more collaborative environment.  Members of an agricultural 
cooperative must trust the cooperative and one another in order for the enterprise to be a 
success.  Members must trust that each will honor and make the right choices to 
advance the group effort.  Farmers often have similar backgrounds, values and goals.  
Therefore, they are more likely to trust and form solidarity with one another. 
                                                          
49 Rauscher, Frederick. "Kant's Social and Political Philosophy." Stanford University. 
50 George, Jennifer M.. "The Experience And Evolution Of Trust: Implications For Cooperation And 
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Game Theory  
Game theory is, in a simple explanation, a way of thinking about choices and 
how other actors react to those choices.51  The most famous games in game theory are 
the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and the “Stag Hunt.”  Both games represent the struggle 
between players to act collectively.  In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players are forced 
between confessing to the police or remaining silent.  If both prisoners remain silent, 
they will receive a minimal sentence, if one confesses and one stays silent, the first will 
go free and the second will serve a long sentence.  If both confess, they will receive a 
medium sentence.  Both players would be better off if they cooperated, but risk aversion 
forces them to confess.52  In the Stag Hunt, a group of hunters is hiding to hunt a stag.  
The hunters see a rabbit, but if any of them move to get it, the stag will escape and the 
other hunters will starve.  Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this game encourages 
collective action. The results from the games rely on whether the participants can 
communicate with each other.  The payouts for the games also alter the players’ 
decisions.  In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the biggest possible payout comes from defecting 
when the other person cooperates and the worst possible payout is cooperating when the 
other person defects.  While in the Stag Hunt, the biggest payout comes from both 
people cooperating and the worst comes from both defecting.  
A common outcome from multiplayer games that require cooperation is a Nash 
Equilibrium.53  In game such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player is pressured to 
confess.  The best possible outcome is to confess while the other player remains silent.  
                                                          
51 Levine, David. UCLA, "What is Game Theory?" Last modified 04 16, 2013. Accessed November 28, 
2013. 
52 GameTheory.net, "Prisoner's Dilemma." Accessed November 28, 2013. 
53 McCain, Roger A.. ""Solutions" to Nonconstant Sum Games." Nash Equilibrium.  
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The worst possible outcome is to remain silent while the other player confesses.  This 
incentivizes both players to defect.  The result is suboptimal but acceptable to both 
players. 
According to John Staatz, an agricultural economist, cooperatives can be 
thought of as a cooperative game because a large number of players must decide how to 
allocate services and surpluses amongst themselves.54 Also, farmers will not decide to 
join a cooperative unless the benefits they receive are greater than any other 
configuration. They will leave the cooperative if it is advantageous for them to do so.55  
Farmers are rational actors and will not cooperate unless it is in their financial interest 
to do so. 
Collective Action 
 The concept behind collective action is that a group of individuals can 
accomplish more than the members of that group can accomplish individually.  
Conventional wisdom dictates that a group of individuals with common interests will 
naturally work together for their mutual benefit.  However, in 1965, Mancur Olson, an 
economist at the University of Maryland, introduced the idea of a collective action 
problem.56 He emphasized two examples of collective action problems: public goods 
and free riders.  Public goods are goods that cannot be provided by the private 
enterprise because they are not profitable.  The reason for this is that a person cannot be 
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excluded from utilizing the good; and access to the good is not competitive.  A classic 
example of a public good is a lighthouse; a boat kept safe by the lighthouse cannot be 
compelled to pay for the service.  The free rider problem is when a group collaborates 
to accomplish something and an individual who did not contribute to the project still 
benefits from it.  Imagine an asteroid is headed for the Earth.  All the countries of the 
world pool their resources to build a bomb to blow up the asteroid, except one.  If the 
plan is successful, the abstaining country would be rewarded for its bad behavior by not 
getting hit by the asteroid and not having to contribute to solving the problem.  Marx is 
drawn on to explain how a minority can come to dominate the majority.  This would 
appear to be the case between agricultural producers (who are numerous) and 
processors (who are few).  Olson concludes that collective action is easier to achieve 
among a small group rather than a large one.   
Agricultural issues are specifically mentioned by Olson as an area of interest 
where collective action is applicable. First, he acknowledges the potential for political 
action on behalf of farmers.  He notes that there have been many farmers’ organizations 
throughout the history of the United States; however, few of them remain viable in the 
present day.57  During the Progressive Era, farmers controlled a significant faction 
within the Democratic Party which culminated in the nomination of William Jennings 
Bryan in the Presidential Election of 1896.58  They strongly supported pro-farmer 
populist policies such as printing greenbacks and Free Silver.  However, these 
movements were ultimately unsuccessful in achieving their aims and William Jennings 
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Bryan lost all three of his elections as presidential nominee.  The Grange, a lobby group 
for farming and ranching interests, formed a successful and influential organization 
between 1867 and 1880.  During that period, the Grange successfully lobbied for the 
creation of the Farm Credit System and the extension service.  Although it still remains 
active today, the institution declined greatly due to financial and organizational 
difficulties.  These difficulties arose because of the group’s rapid expansion like 
“wildfire” in which gained hundreds of thousands of members in a matter of months.  
This meant that the organization’s structure didn’t have time to grow sustainably and it 
fell as quickly as it rose. 
Olson also describes the success of the Farm Bureau as the largest and most 
widespread farmer’s organization in the nation.  The Farm Bureau is not strictly 
speaking a cooperative; however it provides services and education to member farmers.  
In its early days, 1911-1914, it also functioned as a political organizer for farming 
interests.  After its success in this capacity, these functions were curtailed because the 
bureau accepted public funds.  The Farm Bureau is a prime example of member owned 
and service driven organizations that are not cooperatives.  They use collective action to 
provide services or achieve political change. 
Another important article on collective action is “Bowling Alone” by Robert 
Putnam, a political scientist at Harvard University. This could be considered a corollary 
to collective action problems; with an emphasis on the decline of modern American 
society.59  The argument is that the inclination toward collective action comes from 
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community engagement.  People who have repeated interactions on a regular basis build 
trust and are more likely to cooperate.  By increasing member control and democratic 
participation in a cooperative, individuals will have increased solidarity with one 
another and collective action will be more effective. 
Member Relations 
Member relations indicate the relationships between management and the 
shareholder-members. Even though they are affiliated with the same organization, these 
relationships can be somewhat strained.  Atmiş, et. al wrote an a report on Turkey’s 
Forestry Cooperatives with an emphasis on member relations and poverty reduction. 
The report was written at the behest of the World Forestry Congress, a gathering of 
foresters from around the world sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization.  
According to the report, “Management and members of cooperatives suffer a 
communication problem, which cause the members to lose their loyalty in their 
cooperatives. Only when the management staff explains what they do for what reason 
can the relations between the management and the members improve,”60  Furthermore, 
management and the members have somewhat divergent interests. Atmis states, 
“Villagers are interested in cooperatives through which they can obtain concrete 
benefits in the short run,”61 Members want to see positive results immediately, like any 
group of investors. (The problem is compounded in the developing world, where the 
membership is poor and without other income opportunities.) Meanwhile, the 
management, like any good executive team, wants to think long term by expanding and 
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growing their business.  This is a serious problem that must be overcome in order to 
make cooperatives a viable business model.  According to Gulen Ozdemir, member 
relations in cooperatives will be stronger if the organization is run in a more democratic 
fashion.62  
 Member relations are an example of the economic concept of the principal-agent 
problem.  The Principal-agent problem occurs when the membership of a group selects 
leaders to represent its interests.63  The problem arises because often the appointed 
managers have different priorities and interests than the membership.   Managers feel 
loyalty to the institution and not necessarily the membership. 
 There are two economic components to the principal-agent problem.  Moral 
hazard is when a person has no incentive to behave responsibly.  The most common 
example of moral hazard is insurance.  For example, if a person buys car insurance, they 
have a reduced incentive to drive cautiously because their car will be replaced if they 
crash it.  Lucian Bebchuk, a professor at Harvard Law School, applies this principle to 
business through CEO pay.64  In the corporate world, CEOs are paid highly regardless 
of their job performance. Therefore, CEOs do not have to be good at their jobs in order 
to be successful, which results in poor performance.  Bebchuk also cites information 
asymmetry as a factor.  The principal has no way to measure or account for the agent’s 
actions.  How could a shareholder determine if poor performance was the fault of the 
CEO or structural economic factors? 
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 Hart and Grossman, both economists, analyzed the principal-agent problem 
through the lens of game theory.65  A situation that features the principal-agent problem 
can be described as a cooperative game because two or more parties must work together 
to succeed.  Through their study, they determined that the problem inevitably results in 
a Nash Equilibrium, which is a suboptimal outcome for both parties.   
This problem is easily applicable to politics in a democracy or to business in 
both a for-profit and cooperative model.  As an example, imagine a medium-sized 
agricultural supply cooperative.  The cooperative has members who invest capital in the 
cooperative in exchange for fertilizer, pesticides, and livestock feed.  The shareholders 
have a mechanism to indicate how the company should use their investment and 
provide services: voting.  A shareholder votes for the board of directors who then in 
turn select an executive staff.  However, once installed, the management team decides 
to expand their services by selling to nonmembers.  Suppose this proposition will bring 
in a significant amount of money for the cooperative and make it more financially 
stable.  However, it will mean that the quality of services provided to cooperative 
members will decrease.  The management has an incentive to pass this proposal because 
it will help the cooperative long term, which employs them.  The members would 
oppose this action because it violates their financial interests as patrons.   
No group is at fault in this situation.  One might be inclined to always be in 
support of the membership.  However, that assumes that the membership is infallible.  
The shareholders (the principals) might be in favor of bad strategies that the 
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management (the agents) would otherwise avoid.  In finance, many “activist investors” 
advocate policies that are bad for the overall health of the company.  They do this in 
order to boost the short-term stock price and make a personal profit.  Given these 
possibilities for error or bad faith on both sides, the principal-agent relationship is likely 
to always be a fraught one. 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this review of the areas of scholarly literature and theory related 
to agricultural cooperatives was to lay a foundation for the practical evidence that I will 
present in my research findings in chapter 4.  It is important to merge theoretical and 
empirical knowledge and hope that my thesis has a satisfactory synthesis of both.  This 
review of literature reflects my interdisciplinary approach by presenting primarily 
theories from economics and political science.  My goal was to move from the most 
abstract theories to the most practical. In the next chapter, I will explain my research 
methods and give detailed explanation to the process I will take to answer my research 
question.  I relied heavily on the theory discussed here to craft interview questions.  My 
research question draws on the theories discussed in this chapter by asking whether 
democratic control is linked to collective action and cooperation.  And whether 
cooperation and collective action are linked to successful cooperatives. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I detail the methods I used to explore my research question.  This 
study used two distinct methodologies: qualitative information gathered from interviews 
and textual analysis of documents related to agricultural cooperatives in Turkey.  The 
chapter itself consists of sections that give a detailed a description of the research 
design, discuss which sources I used, explain specifically how I conducted interviewed 
and analyzed documents, and review the potential limitations and weaknesses of my 
study.   
Research Design 
The methodology has two aspects: interviews with key informants and 
document analysis.  Through this combined approach, I take advantage of the strengths 
of both interviews and textual analysis.  These research methods are complementary 
because they present theoretical and experiential explanations of agricultural 
cooperatives in Turkey.  One aspect of my thesis seeks to understand how the Turkish 
state interacts with cooperatives.  In that regard, it would be inadequate to only analyze 
the government’s perspective through official documents without taking into account 
the facts on the ground.  However, cooperatives themselves are not represented through 
such documents; therefore the interviews are necessary and complement the other part 
of the methodology. 
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Sources  
I conducted interviews with five key informants who have special expertise by 
virtue of their experience or knowledge with agricultural cooperatives in Turkey.  Both 
American and Turkish citizens are represented in the interviews in order to 
communicate a broader spectrum of perspectives and opinion.  The key informants fall 
into three not mutually exclusive categories: academics, government officials, and 
practitioners involved directly in agricultural cooperatives.  In recruiting academics, I 
contacted several people in the Agricultural Economics Department at Ankara 
University.  I also contacted several other professors in agriculture related fields in 
Turkey and the United States.  For contacts in government, I contacted the U.S. 
Embassy in Ankara, Turkey and the Turkish Embassy in Washington.  For contacts in 
cooperative agriculture, I contacted the vice president of sales of a local Oregon 
cooperative that was active in Turkey.  For all my recruitment procedures, I contacted 
the potential interview subject by email and explained my project and asked if they 
would be willing to be interviewed.  I found potential interviewees by emailing 
academics that specialized in Turkish agriculture.  I contacted the several members of 
the agricultural economics faculty at Ankara University.  While many people I 
contacted did not personally have knowledge or experience with cooperatives in 
Turkey, they were able to give me support and refer me to people who did.  The 
interview subjects were chosen because they voluntarily responded to my email and had 
time in their schedule to be interviewed.  Another factor in selecting subjects was 
whether they spoke English and had means to conduct the interview through Skype, 
telephone, or email. 
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In order to find documents, I first used a simple Google search and a Google 
Scholar search.  Then I looked for reports and white papers at many non-governmental 
organizations and think tanks.  I utilized resources published by international bodies 
like the United Nations and European Union.  The United Nations declared 2012 the 
“International Year of Cooperatives” and has produced much literature on the subject.  I 
looked at reports published by the United States Foreign Agriculture Service, an agency 
within the Department of Agriculture.  The Republic of Turkey has also published 
strategic documents on cooperatives, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Trade and Customs, which regulate agricultural cooperatives. 
Instrumentation  
I recruited potential interview subjects through email.  I utilized Google Scholar 
and similar resources to find academics and others who had experience in international 
cooperatives and Turkish agriculture.  I sent each potential contact an email asking if 
they would be willing to be interviewed and waited for a response.  I also asked them if 
they knew anyone else who would be knowledgeable about the topic or had relevant 
documents I could analyze.  In order to increase participation, if I heard nothing for a 
week, I sent a follow-up email.   
In preparation for the interviews, I developed a series of open-ended questions 
aimed at revealing the subjects’ views and opinions on agricultural cooperatives in 
general and specifically in Turkey.  I interviewed each subject only once for 
approximately an hour at the most, depending on the subject’s knowledge of the topic 
and the constraints on their schedule. 
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For my document analysis, I skimmed through each report and took notes on the 
primary ideas and themes through the document.  Then I searched through the text of 
the document for words or concepts that relate to my specific research question and read 
those passages carefully.   
Limitations 
 The main limitations of my thesis are that I do not speak Turkish and did not 
travel to Turkey to do primary research.  Traveling to Turkey would have been 
preferable in order to attain accurate firsthand knowledge and qualitative data on 
Turkey’s agricultural cooperatives.  Being able to speak, read and write Turkish would 
have been ideal because it would have given me access to more possible interview 
subjects who do not speak English and would have allowed me to use Turkish language 
documents. 
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Chapter IV: Research Findings 
Introduction  
 In this chapter, I present the results of my study.  My interviews and document 
analysis have produced many individual anecdotes and facts that I have organized into a 
few greater themes.  The chapter begins with a detailed description of cooperatives in 
Turkey as a historical movement from the time of Atatürk to the present.  This section 
also explains the regulatory apparatus that governs cooperatives and explains their 
financial state at the present time.  Then I move into the larger themes that were gleaned 
from my research.  First, I cover the relationship between members and the cooperative 
management.  Second, I examine the degree to which individuals participate in the 
cooperatives in which they hold memberships in.  Third, I discuss the role of the state in 
governing and supporting cooperatives and the general impact the government has on 
cooperatives.  Then, I discuss the business climate, the size of farms and other factors 
that may contribute to the state of cooperatives in the country.  At the end of the chapter 
I cover the viability of cooperatives going forward into the future.  After that, I report 
on some of the proposed alternatives to cooperatives in Turkey. 
 I conducted interviews with five key informants, experts in various ways on 
Turkish cooperatives.  The first person I interviewed was Samet Settras.  He is 
employed as an agricultural analyst by the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service at the 
U.S. Embassy in Ankara.  Previously, he worked for the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock as an analyst.  Of all the 
people I interviewed, he was the most pessimistic.  Throughout the interview, it was 
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clear that he was disillusioned with Turkish politics and the prospects of agriculture in 
the country.  This might explain why chose to work for the U.S. Embassy rather than 
the government of Turkey.  Ultimately, he believed that cooperatives could not be 
reformed without regime change in Turkey.   
 When I interviewed Samet Settras, another USDA employee also participated.  
Jess Paulson initially responded to my email and set up the interview.  He served as 
more of a facilitator role than an active interview subject.  He also helped translate some 
abstract concepts we were trying to communicate because there was somewhat of a 
language barrier.  He only contributed a single quote to my findings, but he seemed to 
support Samet’s interpretation of the situation.     
 The second person I interviewed was Unal Ornek.  He is an agricultural 
economist and works as a consultant for cooperatives in Turkey.  Additionally, he 
writes articles and blogs for organizations such as the World Bank and the International 
Cooperative Alliance.  He was the most optimistic expert I spoke to.  His stance might 
be explained by his position as an “insider” among cooperatives.  He acknowledged 
many of the problems identified by the other interview subjects; however, his 
prescriptions were less severe.   
 The third interview I conducted was with Doug McClellan.  He is the Vice 
President of Sales and Marketing at the Hazelnut Growers of Oregon, an Oregon-based 
cooperative.  Over the course of his career, he has traveled to Turkey many times and 
was very familiar with their agricultural sector and hazelnut market.  He is able to bring 
an outsider’s perspective because he is not directly involved in Turkey’s cooperatives, 
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but is knows about cooperative governance and principals.  He provided an insight into 
Turkey’s business culture and international trade. 
 My final interview was with Kassim Al-Khatib.  He is a professor of agriculture 
at the University of California, Davis.  Unlike my other interview subjects, he has no 
background in agricultural economics, social science, or business.  Instead, he is an 
expert in the agricultural sciences.  He is a Turkish national, but currently resides in the 
United States.  This might account for his explanation of cooperatives that varies greatly 
from the other interviews. 
Findings 
State of Turkey’s Cooperatives 
 Before I address specific issues on why Turkish cooperatives remain stagnant, it 
would be helpful to provide a more in-depth explanation of the current state of the 
cooperative movement.  This section is distinct from my background because it draws 
heavily on my original research, the interviews I conducted and documents I analyzed.  
This explanatory information focuses on the fiscal health of cooperatives, the 
development of cooperatives and the regulation of them, and the structure of 
cooperatives (especially in comparison to the United States and the European Union).  
This provides a foundation that frames the rest of my findings as well as my policy 
recommendation. 
 It can be broadly stated that cooperatives as a group in Turkey are in poor 
financial health.  To be more specific, the financial status depends greatly on the type of 
cooperative.  As of this writing, Turkey’s agricultural sales cooperatives are in dire 
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straits.  According to Samet Serttas, an agricultural specialist at the United States 
Embassy in Ankara, every single agricultural sales cooperative in the country is 
currently going through bankruptcy proceedings.  He expects only one will survive the 
bankruptcy process and eventually return to profitability.  According to a 2006 report by 
the World Bank on the Turkish financial sector, agricultural sales cooperatives are 
having difficulty securing stable access to credit.66  This obstacle, coupled with 
continually running annual deficits, led to the mass bankruptcy epidemic. 
Agricultural credit cooperatives, on the other hand, find themselves in a stronger 
position financially.  In recent years, agricultural credit cooperatives have become 
profitable and even expanded their enterprises outside of Turkey to Iran and Bulgaria.  
Samet Serttas noted that Gübretaş, a Turkish producer of fertilizer owned by an 
agricultural credit cooperative, recently acquired an Iranian fertilizer producer, Razi 
Petrochemical, for $656 million.  According to the aforementioned 2006 World Bank 
report, Turkish agricultural credit cooperatives began a transformational restructuring in 
2005 to comply with a series of reforms passed in 2004 and 2005.  According to the 
World Bank, their long term success and growth will depend on “improved corporate 
governance, rationalizing its cost structure, covering IT costs and expected losses 
through increasing its interest rates charged to market levels, and eventually increasing 
its access to funds through liquidation of non-core assets and increasing its liabilities.”67  
Of course, this is easier said than done.  But the World Bank indicated optimism for this 
restructuring process because both policymakers and those within agricultural credit 
cooperatives expressed desire to implement the proposed changes.  In the eight years 
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since the World Bank report, the resurgence of agricultural sales cooperatives indicates 
that the process achieved its desired effect. 
 Agricultural development cooperatives are of somewhat ambiguous financial 
health.  According to Gulen Ozdemir, they have achieved a moderate level of financial 
stability while providing more useful services than agricultural credit cooperatives.68  
However, he notes that this analysis is not unanimously supported by scholars.  Their 
financial stability comes from combining services of small cooperatives that would 
otherwise have a membership in the single digits.  It is difficult to maintain a 
cooperative with such a small membership and these small cooperative often dissolve 
under financial pressures caused by drought or price instability.  Agricultural 
development cooperatives consolidate smaller service oriented cooperatives in order to 
have the security of a large cooperative. 
 Turkey’s cooperatives are distinctly categorized by their hierarchical structure.  
The method I use for defining this structure is the “top down vs. bottom up” dichotomy.  
A top-down organization has power concentrated at the top of the organization.  
Decisions are made at the top and passed down the chain of command.  In contrast, a 
bottom-up organization, which could also be described as grassroots or “flat,”  makes 
decisions collectively and passes instructions up to management to implement. 
According to a report by the Food and Agriculture Organization, Turkish agricultural 
credit cooperatives are notoriously top-down.69  From their creation in 1935 to their 
reform in 1972, they remained an official extension of the Ministry of Food, 
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Agriculture, and Livestock.  To this day, all their loans must be approved by the Ziraat 
Bankası, a large government-owned agricultural bank in Turkey, their funding must be 
approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (parliament), and the Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture, and Livestock plays a strong role in selecting their board members.  
Sales cooperatives and development cooperatives, in contrast, are less 
hierarchical.  Gülen Özdemir argued that agricultural development cooperatives are 
structured more like bottom-up organizations.70  They must have at least seven 
members to form a charter and get credit through the Ziraat Bankası.  Other than that, 
they have much more flexibility in their governance than agricultural credit 
cooperatives.  This is because they are active and controlled almost exclusively in the 
most rural areas of Turkey and receive little government funding.  Agricultural sales 
cooperatives fall somewhere in the middle between credit and development 
cooperatives.  They receive more government support, but they are also subject to strict 
auditing from the Ministry of Customs and Trade.   
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, cooperatives were 
implemented early on in the Republic under Atatürk.  Atatürk’s support for 
cooperatives came from the belief that they would have the effect of “modernizing 
Turkish society so as to broadly distribute the economic benefits and encourage 
democratic participation.”71  At this point the Turkish Republic was still quite new and 
democracy was an unfamiliar concept.  The rationale was to promote democracy in 
another arena in order to legitimize the new regime.  He was also trying to rapidly 
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modernize a nation that was considered an economic backwater.  Cities were able to 
benefit from industrialization, but as the report notes, Turkey was still overwhelmingly 
rural and agrarian.  Cooperatives could theoretically raise yields and distribute the 
surpluses equally among the actors.  The initial legislation created forty cooperatives 
located in Western Turkey. 
  In 1929, the Grand National Assembly passed Law no. 1470; which legalized 
agricultural credit cooperatives.72  Any village with a population greater than five 
hundred could form a cooperative.  By 1930, Turkey had 191 registered cooperatives.  
In 1935, Law no. 2834 allowed the creation of agricultural sales cooperatives.  In the 
1960s, Turkey began making 5 year plans to set goals and focus the cooperative sector.  
The first 5 year plan created agricultural development cooperatives in 1964 as “village 
development cooperatives.” 
In each successive plan, the Turkish government followed the mantra of “strong, 
effective and democratic cooperatives based on voluntary initiatives would be 
supported.”  The government between the 1960s and the present provided strong 
financial support in exchange for heavy regulation. The 5 year plans also divided 
control of cooperatives among different ministries.  In the 2001-2005 plan, the Ministry 
of Customs and Trade announced that it would allow agricultural credit cooperatives 
more autonomy.  In practice what this meant was that the government would no longer 
pay off the cooperatives’ annual deficits.  This plan also initiated an eight year period of 
reform and restructuring for agricultural credit cooperatives, similar to the one that 
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agricultural credit cooperatives went through in 2006.  However, this process was less 
successful for sales cooperatives. 
The most current 5 year-plan, published by the Ministry of Customs and Trade, 
states that Turkey is growing more “globally competitive and fully completed her 
coherence with the European Union.”73  Samet Settras notes that Turkey has mostly 
adopted cooperative laws and practices from the European Union.  Turkey made that 
decision rather than adopt their own for two reasons.  First, the European Union has had 
great success with their cooperatives and it is understandable that Turkey would want to 
emulate that success.  Second, Turkey and the European Union have long been in 
negotiations for accession.  Most observers of the process think that Turkey will 
ultimately not join.  However, Turkey is still changing its laws in order to be compliant.  
Therefore, it would be worthwhile to examine the regulations and protocols of the 
European Union. 
According to the European Union’s website, a cooperative may be formed by 
five natural persons in the European Union,74 as opposed to seven people in Turkey.75  
Cooperatives must have the following characteristics: “1. Possibility of free, open, and 
voluntary association and withdrawal from the enterprise.  2. Democratic structure, with 
each member having one vote, majority decision making and an elected leadership 
accountable to its members.  3. Equitable, fair and just distribution of economic results.  
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4. Autonomous and independent.”76  The European Union also created the European 
Society for Cooperatives.77  This is a supranational organization that ensures 
cooperatives are uniform across international boundaries.  It does not supersede national 
laws on cooperatives, but it does homogenize cooperatives and attempt to improve 
cooperative governance across the European Union.  Also, it allows cooperatives to 
collaborate across national boundaries.  Although free trade is one of the fundamental 
tenets of the European Union, the Cooperative Society allows these organizations to 
cooperate and integrate past what is allowed for for-profit corporations.   
Member Relations 
Samet Settras also noted that the board of directors in every cooperative is 
chosen by the ministry that controls it.  The cooperative still holds elections; but the 
ministry selects a slate of candidates for each position.  He was unclear as to what 
would occur if a cooperative declined to select the ministry’s slate.  Presumably, the 
government’s financial support would be withdrawn, which would put many 
cooperatives in dire straits.  The government’s position on the issue is understandable.  
They view their support as an investment and as such they have a right to control that 
investment.  However, that attitude violates the fundamental principles of cooperatives.  
Doug McClellan works as Vice President of Sales and Marketing for the Hazelnut 
Growers of Oregon, a marketing cooperative that does business in Turkey.  He stated 
that in his experience, polices such as this lead to weak cooperatives that never function 
properly.  Furthermore, the selections for the slates appear to be politically motivated.  
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The positions of cooperative board member or executive staff member are seen as 
stepping stones for ambitious young politicians. They are often given to prominent 
agricultural families to control in order to gain their political support.  These positions 
are doled out as political spoils rather than to qualified candidates.   
Unal Ornek, a Turkish consultant for cooperatives, argued that one of the central 
problems of cooperatives in Turkey is the lack of leadership.  As a result of the 
preferential hiring and election process, Turkey’s cooperatives are plagued by poor 
management.  The board members are often either member farmers serving their own 
interests, or politicians who have little interest in the position that they have been given.  
Also, the education and training for cooperative leaders is lackluster.  The business 
higher education system is not as good as in the United States, especially in the niche of 
agriculture.  When a person has good business experience and credentials, they would 
rather lead a for-profit corporation than a cooperative.  The pay is less and the 
organizations have a negative reputation.  Therefore, cooperative leaders tend to be the 
sort that doesn’t have other options because they are incompetent.  If they are 
competent, the job is just a stepping stone to more prestigious and profitable positions. 
According to Kassim Al-Khatib, a professor of agriculture at UC Davis and a 
Turkish national, one of the issues of equity surrounding cooperatives is actually 
between members.  Members from larger farms tend to have a larger voice in the 
governance of the cooperatives than smaller farmers.78  Cooperatives may give 
preferential treatment or better prices to members that bring in more business.  They 
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might allow a big farmer to have a seat on the board or have some form of 
representation on the board.  In voting, the biggest farmer might be given more votes.  
Since the opportunity cost would be great if the big member left the cooperative, there 
is an incentive for other members to allow this in order to protect their business. 
Member Participation 
Unal Ornek notes that another central problem with cooperatives in Turkey is 
the lack of participation by members.  Because the elections are uncompetitive, the 
membership tends to not feel compelled to vote in them.  This deprives the cooperative 
and the membership of an effective mechanism to communicate their desires and 
evaluation of the cooperative’s performance.  In order to be useful to the membership, 
cooperatives need guidance from the membership on the future of the cooperative.  In 
order to be an efficient organization, they need to be able to see their weak points.  The 
members are in a uniquely strong position to do that, but they have no means to do so.  
This produces an infinite cycle of inattentive and disengaged managers and members, 
which leads to a principle-agent problem.  Agricultural development cooperatives 
tended to have higher degrees of participation according to Gulen Ozdemir.  In contrast 
to agricultural credit cooperatives, their elections were less ministry controlled.  
Overall, members tended to be more satisfied with the services provided and the 
cooperative as a whole.  They attended more meetings and were more likely to 
understand the democratic principles behind cooperatives. 
Both Samet Settras and Unal Ornek noted that the members were often not 
involved in their cooperatives financially or otherwise because they were forced to join 
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the cooperative.  In certain commodity markets, the government requires farmers to join 
a particular cooperative in order to receive benefits or aid.  The problem with this policy 
is that it is blind to the needs of farmers.  Why should a farmer join a cooperative that 
provides services they have no use for?  Instead of swelling the numbers of cooperatives 
and promoting them, it bloats the membership with farmers who are uninvolved and 
disinterested in the cooperative. 
Financial participation is also a related problem.  To a certain extent, it is 
irrelevant if the member is actively participating in the cooperative through governance 
as long as the member continues to trade with the cooperative.  If an individual 
maintains their membership and actively makes financial transactions with the 
cooperative, that expresses some degree of satisfaction with the organization.  However, 
among members of certain cooperatives, this can be a problem even though it is a 
relatively low bar to pass.  Unal Ornek also notes this problem as a subset of 
participation problems.  It is especially problematic among agricultural credit 
cooperatives and other large cooperatives.  The specific services they provide allow an 
individual to gain membership but do not necessitate using that membership.  This is a 
financial problem because due to the structure, a cooperative cannot survive on 
membership fees or other revenues that are gained through inactive members.  This 
problem is two-fold.  Members use the passive benefits allowed to them by cooperative 
membership, but do not patronize the cooperative with the majority of their business.  
An example would be a member using free or subsidized extension services from a 
cooperative but choosing to sell their crops to a for-profit corporation because the price 
is higher.  Gülen Özdemir found that a higher number of members were satisfied with 
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the services provided by agricultural development cooperatives over agricultural credit 
cooperatives.  He also noted that they traded more with agricultural credit cooperatives 
over agricultural credit cooperatives. 
State Support 
A central theme that has arisen from the discussion of cooperatives in Turkey is 
the question of state support.  Has the government helped or hindered the cooperative 
movement by providing them with extensive support, both financial and otherwise?  
The question extends beyond just cooperatives to the entire agricultural sector.  
Decisions made by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock in areas of 
agriculture ostensibly unrelated to cooperatives still have an impact upon them. 
In my first interview for this study, I spoke with Jess Paulson and Samet Settras 
of the Foreign Agricultural Service at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey.  At the 
opening of the interview, Paulson discussed the design of my study.  He recommended 
that I also study the agricultural economies in other nations in Eastern Europe as a 
comparison.  When asked to elaborate, he explained that Turkey could be at times 
“inconsistent.”  By this he meant that Turkey, the Turkish government in particular, 
espouses contradictory policies and goals.  The actions it takes help one sector but harm 
another sector, and as a result the entire system becomes inefficient.  He gave an 
example of the government wanting to help grain producers and artificially inflating the 
price.  This had the effect of helping grain growers but being disastrous for livestock 
producers. 
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Another prime example of this is in the market for hazelnuts.  The government 
wished to provide assistance to the hazelnut growers. According to Doug McClellan, for 
many years, the Turkish government simply bought large amounts of hazelnuts directly.  
This ensured that demand would always meet supply and stabilize the price to help the 
growers.  The government, rather than immediately process and sell the hazelnut crop 
domestically or abroad, kept the crop in warehouses for several years.  After becoming 
tired of sitting on huge quantities of hazelnuts, it would dump several years’ crop on the 
international market all at once.  This policy was a failure for several reasons.  It was 
expensive for the government and yielded no monetary profit.  It undermined the 
international hazelnut market every few years when the government sold off its 
hazelnuts.  Because the hazelnuts were being stored in warehouses for several years, the 
quality of the crop was extraordinarily bad.  Despite being inefficient and wasteful, the 
period when this policy was in effect ruined the reputation of hazelnuts internationally.  
This peculiar policy reminds one of the Japanese policy of importing rice and storing it 
in warehouses to comply with WTO trade regulations.79 The Japanese meet their 
demand for rice through domestic production and don’t wish to lower the price for their 
farmers by forcing them to compete with foreign rice. 
The policy of the government buying hazelnuts was ended only several years 
ago.  It was replaced by a program that pays hazelnut farmers to cut down their hazelnut 
orchards and allow the land to become fallow.  The goal of the program was to raise the 
hazelnut price by tightening the market supply.  The government targeted the small 
farm plots in the mountainous regions in the Southeast for this program.  Through the 
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removal of hazelnut orchards in areas that are less suited to this type of agriculture, the 
government is supporting increased efficiency in the market, whereas the previous 
policy reduced it.  Kassim Al-Khatib blames this policy for the increasing inequality 
and corporatization in Turkish agriculture.  Through this program, he argues, the 
government is supporting larger farms in fertile areas and pushing small rural farmers 
out of the market completely.  This question draws comparisons to the peculiar 
Agricultural Adjustment Act in the United States.80  This program pays eligible farmers 
not grow crops on their land and kill off livestock in order to tighten the market for 
those commodities.  The program was launched during the Great Depression to stabilize 
the industry which had seen much volatility.  McClellan argues that these programs are 
to blame for the lack of strong hazelnut cooperatives in Turkey.  Because of heavy state 
support, the farmers do not have an incentive to organize for their own interests.  
Furthermore, he alleged that the support was a form of political corruption in which 
financial support was given in exchange for continued political support from farmers. 
Another form of state support came in the form of access to capital.81  The 
government provides loans with 5% interest, quite a low rate historically, from the 
Central Bank of Turkey via the Ziraat Bank.  By providing this access, cooperatives 
have become dependent on it and are unable to access credit through other means.  
When the government shifts away from providing this subsidization, it drastically harms 
the cooperative.  Cooperatives have benefited from a fixed interest rate, especially in 
periods where the Central Bank set interest rates as high as 80%.82 However, by doing 
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this, cooperatives may only attain credit from a single source.  As such, it is hard for 
cooperatives to get funding through credit. 
At a certain point, one must question the wisdom of the 5 year-plan model of 
regulating cooperatives.  Of course it is important to have goals and benchmarks for 
success.  However, the plans are more than that.  They change the levels of support, 
shift regulatory duties, among other things.  This dynamic inevitably leads to some 
confusion among the sector.  It makes the process inherently political and extremely 
volatile.  The process is well-meaning but doesn’t produce the desired results. 
The Turkish government divided the control of agricultural cooperatives among 
the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock and the Ministry of Customs and 
Trade.  According to Samet Settras, this was done for political reasons rather than sound 
regulatory ones.  By spreading control across the ministries, the government created 
unnecessary red tape and bureaucracy.  It also set up an inherent bureaucratic turf war 
between the two ministries.  Both ministries feel immense pressure to have better 
performing cooperatives and to spend as little money on them as possible.  This leads to 
policies such as selecting the board of directors and not paying off agricultural sales 
cooperative deficits.  They are made with the intention of strengthening cooperatives 
and ultimately making them independent. 
Samet Settras also noted the current Turkish coalition government’s ideological 
hostility toward cooperatives.  The current government is considered liberal in the 
European, not American sense of the word, meaning that they are right-leaning on the 
political spectrum. Therefore, they are more supportive of markets and for-profit 
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business.  Despite superficially supporting them, they have no desire for cooperatives to 
become successful or dominant.   
Farm Size and Economic Factors 
Turkey’s agricultural markets are distinct from those in the United States and the 
European Union because of the small size of individual farms.  According to a Food and 
Agriculture Organization report from March 2003, sixty-seven percent of Turkey’s 
farmers own less than 12 acres of land.83  Compare this to the United States, where the 
average size of a small farm is 213 acres.84  However, those farmers only own twenty-
two percent of Turkey’s farmland, while the top five percent of farmers own nearly 
forty percent of the agricultural land in Turkey.85  This information distills to several 
key facts.  The average Turkish farmer owns a very small amount of land.  There are a 
huge amount of farmers producing crops in Turkey.  There is a great deal of inequality 
in the land holdings of rich and poor farmers. 
Kassim Al-Khatib argued that Turkey’s cooperatives are not being mismanaged 
by the government, the bureaucracy, or the cooperative management.  He believes that 
cooperatives are victims of larger structural forces in the agricultural markets and in 
Turkish society as a whole.  In recent years, Turkey has been rapidly industrializing.  
Along with that industrialization trend, there is a rising trend away from land being 
owned by small farmers and toward consolidated family and corporate farms with 
massive land holdings.  He compared the trend to the plight of the small farmer in the 
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United States.  This was the trend that has made cooperatives unsuccessful in the 
country in the past and will continue to dog them in the future.  By his reasoning, 
cooperatives and small farmers have a symbiotic relationship.  The cooperative benefits 
because a small farmer has less individual market power than a larger farmer.  
Therefore, they are more likely to patronize the cooperative.  The farmer benefits 
because they will likely receive a better price than they would from a for-profit 
competitor.  With the decline of the small farmer, cooperatives have also not been able 
to have a stable base of member support.   
 According to Doug McClellan, Turkey’s agricultural sector produces an inferior 
hazelnut crop to that grown in the United States or in Europe.  The reason for this 
inferiority, McClellan believes, is because  the huge number of growers makes it 
difficult to enforce quality.  However, the for-profit corporations he had dealt with were 
well run from a management perspective and had invested in state-of-the art processing 
facilities. 
 Furthermore, the agriculture industry as a whole (including cooperatives) has 
been hurt in doing business internationally by weak contract enforcement.  He stated 
that though the law requires honoring contracts, it is seldom the norm when it is not 
beneficial to the parties.  The law is not widely enforced and the judicial system is not 
as robust and as in the United States. 
Viability of Cooperatives 
 This evidence begs the question, “Do cooperatives have a future in Turkey?”  
This question basically comes down to the evaluation of the previously mentioned 
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problems.  One’s perspective depends on judgments of how severe they are and the 
extent to which they are entrenched into the culture of cooperatives and agriculture.   
The most recent cooperative 5 year-plan was released in 2012 to coincide with 
the United Nations’ Year of Cooperatives.86  In the plan, the Ministry of Customs and 
Trade assesses the strengths and weaknesses of cooperatives through a SWOT analysis.  
They come to the conclusion that cooperatives are an important aspect in Turkish 
agriculture and should be supported and encouraged by both farmers and the 
government.  The government has reason to be highly optimistic about cooperatives and 
their future considering they are under their direct control.  Given that, their SWOT 
analysis is bleak.  There are over twice as many weaknesses as there are strengths; but 
that fact, in and of its self, does not mean anything.  Significantly, the strengths that are 
listed are weak and superficial.  For example, they include: “Legal guarantee in the 
Constitution and in the legislation for the development of cooperatives,” and “Long-
standing and deep-rooted experience in terms of cooperatives in Turkey.”  These 
statements are not false, and they are truly strengths.  However, they appear 
insignificant and superficial in light of weakness column.  They include: “Great number 
of inactive cooperatives waiting liquidation,” and “Inadequate internal and external 
audit mechanisms and their inadequacy in providing the expected benefit.”  The 
weakness column also notes the lack of experienced managers and lack of access to 
capital.  These are very real and serious problems that face cooperatives and make the 
strengths column look all the more paltry by comparison.  Furthermore, the 
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opportunities and threats columns are no better.  As far as these weaknesses are 
concerned, the most troubling aspect is the lack of introspection on the part of the 
government. 
The issue of size is also relevant to the stability of a cooperative.  According to 
Unal Ornek, smaller cooperatives are ineffective; even if they are popular among their 
members.  He is very supportive of agricultural development cooperatives because they 
provide what a smaller village cooperative does with the financial viability of a larger 
cooperative.  The 2012 Turkish action plan notes that the only successful agricultural 
cooperatives are credit cooperatives.  They are successful because they are large 
pseudo-corporate enterprises. 
According to Hagen Henry, the chief of the International Labor Organization’s 
cooperative branch argues that cooperative institutions are more resilient in times of 
crisis than traditional corporations, in financial terms.  In an interview on the 
International Labor Organization’s website, he explained his work studying 
cooperatives and the global financial crisis in 2008.87  He noted that in his home 
country of Germany, not a single cooperative bank filed for financial aid during the 
crisis.  Cooperative institutions actually saw their business improve during the crisis.  In 
fact, “At the peak of the crisis cooperative banks were faced with an increase in 
membership and savings deposits and found it difficult to respond to this sudden growth 
in demand.” 
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Agricultural Unions and Associations 
 Of all the individuals I interviewed over the course of this study, Samet Settras 
was the most bearish on the future of cooperatives.  Without “fundamental change,” (by 
which he appeared to indicate regime change) cooperatives would be never be a 
positive avenue for farmers in Turkey.  The existing structures are unfavorable and are 
entrenched against reform.  This begs the question, “If not cooperatives, then what?”  
According to Settras, the answer to this lies in agricultural associations and unions.  
These are civil society organizations in agriculture that operate similarly to 
cooperatives.  They serve the same function and provide similar services.  However, 
they exist outside of the current regulatory structure for cooperatives.  This provides 
them the flexibility to innovate and be successful. 
 However, not all Turkish agriculture experts agree on the benefits of these 
organizations.  Unal Ornek is especially vocal in his opposition to them.  He claims that 
they aren’t meaningfully different from cooperatives.  They divide the movement and 
therefore inhibit collective action and organizing efforts.  Perhaps most controversially, 
he accused the proponents of unions and associations as bringing about a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  They claim that they do not support cooperatives because they are 
unsuccessful, but according to Ornek, they are unsuccessful because they received 
insufficient support.  The people now advocating to divert money and resources away 
from cooperatives toward these new organizations are the same people who opposed 
cooperatives all along. 
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Conclusion 
 My document analysis and interviews with experts reinforce my review of the 
scholarly and professional literature. Despite continued support and interest from 
farmers and the government, Turkish agricultural cooperatives remain inefficient and 
stagnant.  There is no single problem that bedevils the movement.  Instead, there are 
several interlocking issues due to actions by various actors.  This is why the problem of 
cooperatives is so hard to fix.  There is no single issue or actor that can be rectified.  In 
the next chapter, I will draw conclusions from my research findings and make policy 
recommendations based on the evidence. 
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Chapter V: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction  
In this final chapter, I lay out the most salient conclusions and insights from my 
research.  I recap the major issues facing Turkish agricultural cooperatives and examine 
their  practical implications.  Finally, I make a series of policy recommendations for 
cooperatives in Turkey based on the evidence.  
Summary of Issues 
Problems with Cooperatives 
 Turkey’s problems with agricultural cooperatives sort into three categories: 
financial, organizational, and regulatory. Their financial problems are the most visibly 
distressing.  Too many cooperatives cannot turn a profit and run deficits.  For many 
years, the only way some cooperatives, most notably agricultural sales cooperatives, 
have been able to stay afloat was through direct government assistance.  This is 
obviously problematic from a business perspective.  Despite their noble goals, 
cooperatives are not designed to be charitable organizations; they have to be solvent and 
financially self-sustaining. It would be problematic if cooperatives as a group could 
only stay in business in the long term through outside funding. 
 The organizational problems in agricultural cooperatives are more subtle, but 
more ingrained and insidious.  These problems can come from deficiencies among the 
management, the membership, or both.  For example, executives might be corrupt, 
unfamiliar with cooperatives or agriculture, or ill-suited to the position.  This is always 
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a risk with elections in government or the corporate world.  However, the problem is 
exacerbated in this situation because the Turkish government plays a strong role in 
selecting the boards of directors of agricultural cooperatives.  At the same time, the 
members might also be unfamiliar or uninterested with cooperatives their governance.  
They become burdens on the effectiveness of the cooperative. 
 Another endemic problem for cooperatives is the response by the government.  
Actions toward cooperatives by the government come in the form of regulation and 
support.  Government support comes in the form of money or other resources usually 
given in exchange for complying with certain standards.  Regulation is the government 
writing legislation or rules of behavior which and cooperatives to comply with.  Both 
occur with frequency and both have a somewhat troubling dynamic with cooperatives.  
State support creates moral hazard among cooperatives by protecting them from the 
consequences of failure.  Regulations change with every five year plan, so cooperatives 
don’t benefit from stability and continuity. 
 The government’s treatment of cooperatives recalls the “shepherd and flock” 
metaphor from the Ottoman Empire.  The Ottoman Empire adopted a strictly 
hierarchical attitude toward its citizens, but it also delegated many duties to provincial 
governors.  As noted in my background section, this structure is what made the Ottoman 
Empire so large and enduring.  However, these qualities are ultimately what expedited 
its decline and fall.  My research has shown that the heavy hand of the Turkish state 
remains even after reign of the Ottoman Empire.  This mindset of providing “guidance” 
has proved stifling for cooperatives. 
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 In my literature review, I introduced the “Nash Equilibrium” in the context of 
game theory.  The players involved in Turkey’s cooperatives, members, managers, and 
the government, find themselves in a Nash Equilibrium.  Their interests and payouts 
diverge; therefore, they do not cooperate.  In the end, all parties receive less than 
optimal outcomes.   
Cooperatives in Turkey have failed to act collectively as community institutions 
and political pressure groups.  As large associations of farmers, cooperatives have a 
unique opportunity to achieve political action that is advantageous for farmers and for 
cooperatives.   This opportunity is wasted for the same reason that the farm bureau 
ultimately became unsuccessful at political organizing.  They are too close to the state 
and therefore unable to organize to change it.  Outside of agricultural development 
cooperatives, the movement has failed to build up cooperatives as community 
institutions.  They could bring greater dedication to the cooperative, therefore bringing 
that elusive financial stability, if they tied its success to the growth and prosperity of the 
greater community. 
Roadblocks to Success 
One of the principle obstacles to cooperatives’ financial success is access to 
credit.  Unlike a traditional corporation, a cooperative can’t simply issue more stock to 
raise funds.  Raising funds by asking the membership for investment money is an 
option.  However, given that the most cooperative members are impoverished farmers, 
that option is unlikely and unattractive.  Hence, cooperatives must rely on credit to raise 
funds.  The Turkish government requires cooperatives to borrow from the Ziraat Bank 
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at 5% interest.  By closing off other sources of credit, cooperatives have difficulty 
finding funding.   
 Cooperatives must also struggle with finding better leadership.  Cooperative 
leadership has long been lacking for several reasons.  First is the political nature of 
board elections, which appoint individuals based on political loyalty rather than merit.  
Second, cooperatives are negatively affected by the lack of education, experience, and 
technical expertise among cooperative managers.  This can be explained by their weak 
institutions of business and agriculture higher education.  Those that leave the country 
for education tend to stay abroad to work or take higher paying jobs in the government 
or private sector. 
 The response by the government has also been contradictory and unhelpful 
toward the cooperative movement.  On one hand, the state offers support, but on the 
other hand it enforces constraining regulations.  While some state support has provided 
temporary improvements in some instances, it has become clear that Turkey has no 
comprehensive agricultural strategy.  That is why their policy stimulates conflicting 
outcomes.  This has hurt cooperatives along with the rest of the industry and makes one 
pessimistic about the future.  In response, I offer a few suggestions to improve the 
situation. 
Policy Recommendations 
 The first policy that ought to be changed is the government meddling in 
cooperative board elections.  That is clearly a conflict of interest, and violates the 
principles of cooperatives and democracy.  By allowing cooperatives to pick their own 
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leaders, they would have agency and ownership over their decisions, be accountable for 
their own over their successes and failures rather than blaming the government.  This is 
a difficult proposition from the government’s perspective, but it would achieve better 
results in the long term. It would address both member relations and member 
participation problems.   
 Second, the government should end the 5 year-plan as a model for modernizing 
cooperatives.  It has a poor effect on cooperative performance and the five year 
timespan leads to shortsighted decisions.  It also makes no real sense for agricultural 
cooperatives to be paired with nonagricultural ones like housing cooperatives.  Instead, 
planning for nonagricultural cooperatives be completely separate.  Agricultural 
cooperatives should be part of a larger initiative to better plan the entire agriculture 
sector.  Many of Turkey’s agricultural policy decisions are divorced from one another.  
The government does not account for their cause and effect.  This leads to policies with 
contradictory effects and rampant unintended consequences.  Generally, the government 
has too tight a grip on its agricultural sector.  As part of this new comprehensive 
strategy for agriculture, it should adopt a lighter touch. 
 The government should also reform the way cooperatives get access to credit.  
As previously mentioned, the lack of credit is a stumbling block to prosperity for 
cooperatives.  Cooperatives need a more diverse set of options for raising funds.  The 
best option would seem to be allowing cooperatives to borrow from a larger pool of 
private lenders in addition to public loans.  This trade-off would allow cooperatives 
better access to credit, albeit at higher interest rates.  Better access to credit would allow 
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cooperatives to finance expansions to their business and membership and hopefully 
make them profitable in the long run. 
  Finally, the government should slowly reduce the amount of financial aid it 
provides to cooperatives over a number of years.  One of the reasons, I believe, that the 
removal of financial support from agricultural sales cooperatives was so disastrous is 
that it was announced through a 5 year-plan and immediately implemented in full.  
There was no period of transition where the payments slowly decreased.  This made the 
transition harder and more detrimental than it needed to be.  Instead of providing 
monetary aid, the government could provide more nonmaterial support to assist 
cooperatives.  This aid could come in the form of technical assistance and education.  
As was noted in my findings, the quality of Turkey’s agricultural products is lacking 
because of the huge number of small farms.  Improved extension services and education 
could alleviate this problem.  It could also improve competence among the cooperative 
managers and board members. This could come in the form of business and agriculture 
classes which could be specifically geared toward cooperative management. Similarly, 
it could educate members about the principles of democracy and cooperation that 
cooperatives are built on.   
Conclusion 
 These policy recommendations I have made are not without their limits.  What I 
have proposed are relatively small solutions to a much deeper problem.  These reforms 
would not solve the underlying problem in and of themselves if the involved parties are 
not committed to change.  What may be needed is larger and more structural reform 
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within the ministries themselves, a challenging issue that would test the political will of 
any government.  But it will ultimately determine the fate of the cooperative sector.  If 
the government remains aloof and obstinate, perhaps the farmers of Turkey should turn 
to the aforementioned agricultural associations and unions. 
 My research question asks: How does the democratic control of Turkish 
agricultural cooperatives by members influence them as institutions and how does it 
affect their efficacy?  The answer to this question is unclear.  Democratic control is not 
the only factor that affects the efficacy of cooperatives.  The most financially successful 
cooperatives are the least democratic.  And the more democratic ones have trouble 
getting off the ground.  However, the cooperatives that have the greatest impact are 
agricultural development cooperatives; which are very democratic in nature.   
The research I have conducted through reports and interviews has left me rather 
disheartened on the current state of Turkey’s cooperatives.  However, there are some 
glimmers of hope for the future in the form of the government and other actors 
recognizing the problems in the sector.  Furthermore, some of these actors have begun 
to see their role in perpetuating these problems.  Perhaps in the future, farmers and other 
actors may, like the sons of Alan Ho’a, stand together against the world. 
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Appendix 
Appendix: Interview Questions 
 This is a list of template questions that I asked my interview subjects.  They are 
meant to be open-ended and spark a discussion.  They were meant to guide the 
interviews down similar paths that highlight agreement and disagreement among the 
subjects.  These questions are not meant to be comprehensive because I asked follow-up 
questions in response to specific answers by the subject. 
1.My project seeks to understand the effectiveness of Turkish agricultural 
cooperatives and the usefulness of the services they provide to their members.  I also 
want to know to what extent cooperatives are democratized and controlled by their 
members.  Finally, I wish to determine if there is a causal link between democratization 
and the efficacy of the organization.  I plan to explore this issue through conducting 
interviews and an analyzing documents and academic literature. Now that I’ve provided 
you with some background… 
a. What do you think of the general premise of my project? 
b.Before we get into specifics, I’d like to know about your overall views on the 
subject.  What is your general opinion of agricultural cooperatives in Turkey? 
2.How do you feel cooperatives ought to be structured, in order to be most 
successful?  Should cooperatives give more decision-making power to members or to 
managers, or the state? 
3.How are development cooperatives, sales cooperatives, and credit 
cooperatives regarded in Turkey? 
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4.How does the state intervene or regulate agricultural cooperatives in Turkey? 
a. Do cooperatives receive assistance from the state?  What forms does that 
assistance come in? 
b.How does the state treat development cooperatives, sales cooperatives, and 
credit cooperatives? 
c. Is regulation and assistance voluntary? 
5.How would you describe the relationship between cooperative members and 
management? 
a. Do the members and managers have different goals in regard to the future of 
the cooperative? 
b.Are these goals irreconcilable? 
6.In regard to agricultural cooperatives in Turkey… 
a. Would you describe cooperatives as financially stable institutions? 
b.Would you describe cooperatives as democratic institutions?  
c. Should there be more or less state intervention in cooperatives? 
7.Do you have any particular stories or examples of success or failure among 
agricultural cooperatives you’d like to share? 
8.Also, do you have any further ideas or thoughts on the subject that you want to 
mention? 
9.In your opinion, are agricultural cooperatives a viable model to combat rural 
poverty in Turkey? Why or why not? 
10. The other part of my methodology is an analysis of documents; can you 
suggest any English language documents that might be helpful? 
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11. Finally, I would like to ask some basic demographic questions. 
a. What is your nationality? 
b.What is your job title and place of employment? 
c. Please briefly describe your personal or professional involvement with 
agricultural cooperatives. 
d.What is your age? 
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